The Ambitions of Mithridates VI: 
Hellenistic Kingship and 
Modern Interpretations

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Introduction

In 88 BC Mithridates was on top of the world. He had just defeated Rome in a battle, where Roman and Bithynian forces had attacked Pontos on three different fronts, and consequently he conquered the Roman province Asia. Mithridates had proved his ability as a general and king in the eyes of his troops, his court and equally importantly in the Greek cities of Asia Minor, who apparently received him as a liberator freeing them from the Roman yoke (Just. Epit. 38.3; App. Mith. 3.21). In Athens Aristion and other influential men within the ruling political class now turned towards him and Pontos, as the power that was to free the Hellenic world from the rule of Rome (App. Mith. 5.28-29). It was Mithridates’ finest hour. He stood forth as the ruler of an extensive and resourceful kingdom reaching throughout most of the Black Sea region, which offered many economic and demographic resources, and was allied to the king of Armenia Maior, another important power in the East. In contrast, Rome was troubled not only by the instability, which followed the Social War but also, and presumably more importantly, by the accelerating conflict between members of the ruling class. The Senate had announced a declaration of war against Pontos, but Sulla and Marius were fighting each other to obtain the command of the necessary forces.

At this stage Mithridates must have been self-confident and felt that the world lay at his feet. After Rome’s fall from power in the region, he may easily have seen Asia Minor as a natural part of the Pontic Kingdom and he may not have felt terrible threatened by a Rome in internal dispute with an unclear situation in Italy.

Yet we should not mistake the outcome of the war and the responses from the Greek cities which followed, for Mithridates’ political strategy prior to the attack of the Roman commissions in 89 BC. It has been a common assumption throughout modern scholarship that Mithridates was the aggressive party in the conflict. Mommsen, who firmly believed in the idea of Roman defensive imperialism, described Mithridates as an oriental despotic sultan whose lust
for power and conquest caused the outbreak of war in 89 BC. This view was largely followed throughout the 20th century, where Mithridates, with a few exceptions, has been presented as the aggressive party deliberately challenging Rome in a strategy, which, partly out of hatred of Rome and partly out of a desire to enhance Pontic influence in Asia Minor, aimed at a direct confrontation with the Romans.

Another explanation for these wars has been scholars’ view of Mithridates as the Hellenistic king who challenged Rome in an attempt to liberate the Greek world from Roman rule. Where Mommsen and later Bengtson described Mithridates as an oriental despot, with the traits of a sultan, the idea of a saviour king has a tendency to overemphasise the Greekness of Mithridates. As such, Mithridates was either seen in the light of an Osmanic and Eastern despot, who attacked the civilised West, or as a Greek fighting the barbaric and antidemocratic Romans to liberate the more sophisticated Greeks from their rule. Both views are much related either to their authors’ contemporary views on the modern Osmanic state or to the idea of Rome as the violent, unsophisticated and undemocratic superpower dominating the world.

In a recent article published in the Black Sea Centre’s Danish series, Professor Vincent Gabrielsen combines the question of Mithridates’ ambitions with his role as a saviour king from the East. Gabrielsen argues, convincingly, for a more structural explanation to the Romano-Pontic conflict by pointing out that the essential aim of the Hellenistic kings was to maintain and enlarge their kingdoms in order to maintain a firm grip on power. Large or small, the aim, however, was the same, namely to extend their kingdoms as far as possible. Gabrielsen argues that Mithridates’ quest to expand the Pontic Kingdom was notorious and that his imperialistic policies made him and Pontos a significant power in the East. As Mithridates became strong enough to challenge the Romans, he became ready to take over Rome’s dominant position in Asia Minor and as the Greek cities in Asia grew increasingly tired of Rome and particularly Roman publicani, Mithridates had both an excuse and the power to step into the role of a saviour king, who came from the East to liberate the Greeks once again, this time from the Romans.

As a natural consequence Mithridates’ policy of expansion was bound to collide with Roman interests and war between Pontos and Rome was, in that sense, unavoidable. Gabrielsen raises the interpretation of the war between Rome and Pontos above the trivial discussion of whether Mithridates’ policies towards Rome was forced by a general wickedness, an irrational and uncontrollable hatred towards the Roman people, or influenced by an extraordinary desire for power and conquest. Yet, Mithridates is still seen as the aggressive party challenging Rome’s dominant position in Asia Minor in an attempt to overtake Rome’s role and thereby as the one mainly responsible for the outbreak of the First Mithridatic Wars. It is undoubtedly correct that Mithridates was ambitious and under the same pressure to defend and ideally enlarge his kingdom as other Hellenistic kings. But the question that remains to be
answered is still, whether he in his political strategy deliberately aimed for a war with Rome that would end Roman rule in Asia Minor.

**Ambitions and dreams**

A realistic picture of Mithridates’ ambitions and his opinion of Rome is difficult to come by. The available literary sources, mostly from the Roman period, are divided between Cicero’s picture of Mithridates as the king who, driven by a desire for conquest, attacked Roman interests in the region (Cic. *Mur.* 11), and Plutarch’s description of a victim of ambitious Roman senators and generals, who competed to obtain commands against powerful and prestigious enemies (Plut. *Luc.* 5.1, 5.6). Such complicated and immensely prejudiced assessments of the parties’ responsibility and roles as victim or aggressor provides the best argument for seeking a structuralistic approach to the outbreak of the wars between Rome and Pontos.

Mithridates was no doubt both ambitious and eager to conquer the world. During the first 25 years of his rule he transformed Pontos from a smaller and relatively weak kingdom in the central and northern part of Anatolia, with close ties to Rome, to a large and much more autonomous power controlling most of northern and central Anatolia, Kolchis, as well as the northern and northwestern parts of the Black Sea region.6

It is also an obvious assumption that Mithridates hated Rome. How could he not? Had the Romans not taken Phrygia away from the Pontic crown after the death of Mithridates V? Did they not have the habit of interfering in what he must have seen as Anatolian affairs? Were they not simply the strongest power in the region? There is also every reason to believe that Mithridates, as his power in Anatolia and in the Black Sea region grew, hoped that one day he would enlarge his kingdom to contain all of Asia Minor, force Rome out of the region, and become the strongest power in the East.

But such assessments of Mithridates’ dreams and ambitions remain assumptions, which may be of little value to the understanding of the conflict between Rome and Pontos or to the strategy followed by Mithridates in his attempt to make his kingdom strong enough to have a chance of survival. Instead of focusing on Mithridates’ assumed dreams and ambitions or on his personal sentiments towards Rome, it may be more fruitful to direct our attention towards the policies actually followed by Pontos, as this may provide us with an idea of whether or not Mithridates aimed at a final clash over the control of Asia Minor or rather sought simply to establish a strong and vigorous Kingdom of Pontos.

**Pontic policies between 115-89 BC**

With his various attempts to take over Paphlagonia, Kappadokia, Galatia and Bithynia between 107 and 90 BC, Mithridates obviously did choose a policy
that eventually brought him on a collision course with Rome. The annexation of his neighbouring kingdoms may well be explained as part of a strategy to increase Pontic influence in Anatolia and thereby as an act resulting from the ideology of Hellenistic kings and their need to continuously enlarge their domains. Still, the expansion of the Pontic Kingdom in Anatolia need not have been part of a strategy aimed at eliminating Roman influence in Asia Minor. Closely analysed, Mithridates’ imperial policy, between his accession and the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War, was not aimed at a final encounter meant to end Roman rule in Asia Minor. Instead, Mithridates orientated his expansions towards areas where Rome potentially would have few interests or limited reasons for objecting.

The first enlargement of Pontos, the takeover of Armenia Minor and Kolchis, was of little or no interest to Rome, just as Mithridates’ assistance to Greek cities and his fighting of nomadic tribes in the north and northwestern parts of the Black Sea was unlikely to have caused much disturbance in Rome. Step by step, Mithridates had enlarged his kingdom significantly by placing by far the largest part of the Black Sea region under Pontic control without any serious objections from Rome. Mithridates had now transformed his kingdom into a significant power by expanding into eastern Anatolia and the northern part of the Black Sea region, away from Roman interests and the areas bordering the province of Asia.7

The first move of Mithridates that conflicted with Roman interests came in 107 BC with the joint annexation of Paphlagonia by the Bithynian king Nikomedes III and Mithridates.8 Unlike Mithridates, Nikomedes did not have the same options for expanding his possessions, as Bithynia lay squeezed in between Roman Asia and Pontos further to the east. Only Paphlagonia, at the end of the 2nd century BC a rather weak constellation, offered a realistic option for expansion and one that even permitted Nikomedes to conduct a military operation away from the Roman province. How well the two Anatolian kings coordinated their actions against Paphlagonia is difficult to say, but Mithridates used the opportunity to take over the most eastern part of Paphlagonia, which allowed him to further expand his kingdom, even in his home region, and prevent Bithynia’s borders coming too close to the heart of Pontos.

Rome responded to the struggle for power in Anatolia by sending an envoy to demand a full withdrawal from Paphalagonia. But as Rome hesitated to back her demand with force, Nikomedes installed his son as the king of Paphalagonia while Mithridates moved into Galatia and added another territory to his Pontic Kingdom. Rome’s unwillingness to force the kings to accept her demands has been explained as a matter of resources. The wars with Jugurtha in 107 BC and the Cimbrians in 104 BC are often seen as the main explanation why Rome did not move into Anatolia and re-establish control over Paphlagonia. The wars in Africa and against the German tribes proved to be militarily challenging as well as demanding of resources. The Jugurthan
War also further demonstrated the weaknesses within the governing classes of Rome. Seen in this light, it is no wonder that Rome did not try to force Bithynia and Pontos to comply with her demand for a full withdrawal and risk opening another area of instability in a zone, where Rome had few troops and depended on the loyalty of local kings. Paphlagonia was simply far too unimportant for a military intervention of this character.

Whatever reason Rome had for not putting force behind her words, she gave the Anatolian kings the impression that she was either unwilling or unable to interfere in Anatolia at least as long as her own province of Asia was not directly threatened. The Anatolian struggle for power was now taken to Kappadokia, where the longtime Pontic influence through Mithridates’ sister Laodike at the end of the 2nd century BC was replaced by more direct Pontic control after the killing of King Ariarathes and the de facto rule of Laodike. When in 101 BC Nikomedes III approached Laodike with marriage proposals, Mithridates expelled the Bithynians and took over the control of Kappadokia. Once again Rome did not respond to Mithridates’ expansion of Pontos and remained passive until 97 BC, where the Kappadokians revoluted against Pontic rule. Both Nikomedes III and Mithridates then sent delegations to the Roman Senate to argue for their own particular right to Kappadokia, which gave Rome the opportunity to restate her demand for a complete withdrawal from both Kappadokia and Paphlagonia.

That the question of Kappadokia was taken up in the Roman Senate shows that Rome was still regarded as the leading power in Anatolia. Mithridates had without question the resources to put down the revolt, regain complete control in Kappadokia, and reject Bithynian influence. But the fact that he felt the need to have his annexation of Kappadokia approved in Rome strongly suggests that he, at the beginning of the 1st century BC, had no intentions of engaging in a conflict with the strongest military power in the region.

Rome’s status as the strongest power in Asia Minor, and the eagerness of both Nikomedes III and Mithridates to maintain good relations with the Romans are further underlined by their withdrawal from the occupied territories. Certainly, Rome was less troubled at the beginning of the 1st century BC than she had been between 107-104 BC, but the kings, particularly Mithridates, who controlled the larger part of Anatolia and the Black Sea region, could have brought Rome’s desire for a war in Anatolia to the test, had he wished to see how far Rome was ready to go. That he did not meet the challenge indicates that an ultimate contest with Rome was not the aim of Mithridates’ strategy. His aim was more likely to maximise the extension of his Pontic Kingdom as far as possible, as had been the ambition of many other Hellenistic kings before him, but he did not wish to challenge Rome and Roman interests to the point of war. This strategy meant that Mithridates followed a policy that inevitably would collide with Roman interests and force him to comply with whatever demands Rome was ready to fight for. In other words, Mithridates’ future expansion, at least in Anatolia, depended on the political situation in
Rome and her willingness or ability, at any given moment, to wage war on Pontos.

This strategy is even more apparent in the years leading up to the First Mithridatic War. Just after his loss of face in the Senate and his forced withdrawal from Kappadokia, the death of Nikomedes III in 94 BC and the alliance with the king of Armenia together with the outbreak of the Social War once again turned the balance of power in favour of Mithridates. A weak Bithynia and an alliance with Armenia gave Mithridates the upper hand in Anatolia at a time, when Rome was placed under severe pressure by the allies who for generations had constituted the military backbone of Rome’s many victories. No matter whether the Italian allies wished to obtain full Roman rights or to break the Roman domain, the war represented a serious challenge to Rome, which could weaken her world domination or at least her ability to interfere in affairs outside Italy. By the late 90’s BC the Kingdom of Pontos had become a major power in Asia Minor, strong enough to match Rome, at least in her present situation. A new attempt to carry out a longer lasting expansion of Pontos was now a realistic option. Mithridates sent Sokrates, the bastard son of Nikomedes III, into Bithynia to expel Nikomedes IV, and in Kappadokia Armenian forces moved in and replaced the king who was little more than a Roman puppet.

The use of Sokrates and Armenia indicates that Mithridates did not want to play too direct a role in the attack on Bithynia and Kappadokia, but tried to place himself in a position free of blame by placing the overt responsibility on Sokrates and the Armenian king. Again, the strategy used underlines that Mithridates, despite his favourable circumstances, did not want to challenge Rome too openly. That Mithridates’ annexation of Kappadokia and Bithynia was not an attempt to stir up a war with Rome is even further underlined by his complete withdrawal from Bithynia and Kappadokia when the Roman commission, sent to restore the kings, ordered him to re-establish the fallen kingdoms. Had a war with Rome been part of the strategy, it is difficult to explain why Mithridates would have withdrawn from Bithynia and left a strategically important position open to Rome; one that brought Roman forces in control of the Bosporos and close to vital cities in the Pontic homeland.

The whole annexation of Bithynia and Kappadokia in 90 BC seems at first rather unclear and raises various questions. For instance, why did Mithridates take over the two neighbouring kingdoms, knowing that they had Rome’s support, if he was not ready for a war with Rome? And, did he really believe that Rome would not see through the use of Sokrates and Armenia?

Such questions are difficult to answer, especially without seriously underestimating Mithridates’ political understanding and talents as a regent. Today his strategy seems unfocused. If the plan was to avoid war, it failed utterly and the attempt to avoid war after the first withdrawals failed as well. Certainly, Mithridates did come out of the first battles victoriously, but before that his withdrawal exposed his kingdom to a situation, where Rome had a favourable
strategical position, which allowed a three front war to be waged on Pontos. If Mithridates aimed for war with the Romans in 90 BC, his pullback from Bithynia can only be judged as a serious lack of military judgement.

Admittedly Mithridates did make a series of inexplicable choices in the period leading up to the First Mithridatic War, but it may be too simplistic to see these actions as plain incompetence. Instead, it is better to look for a more rational explanation for Mithridates’ decision to take over Bithynia and Kappadokia at a moment, when he knew Rome would strongly oppose his actions. It is still convincing to see the takeover of Bithynia and Kappadokia as a part of the Hellenistic king’s imperialistic ideology and his policy to enlarge his kingdom as far as possible, as pointed out by Vincent Gabrielsen. But, Mithridates seems not to have desired a war with Rome, at least not in 90 BC, and was apparently more eager to avoid war than to wage it.

Instead, he tried to use what he believed to be a weak moment for Rome to take over the remaining two kingdoms in Anatolia, which would make Pontos the other major power in Asia Minor sufficiently strong to match Rome, which Mithridates, at the time maybe rightly so, expected to become less powerful due to the civil war. When considering Mithridates’ ambition as regards to Roman Asia, it is essential to remember that he did not carry through an attack on Asia until he was attacked by the Roman commission, despite the fact that he knew the Social War had weakened Rome.

When Mithridates understood that Rome was not overrun by the socii but was ready to intervene in Anatolia, he tried to avoid the approaching conflict by pulling back from his new domains. He thereby placed himself in a vulnerable position accepting a political defeat to Rome in order to meet her terms: one that must have been noticed with interest by other players in the Anatolian sphere both inside and outside the Pontic domain. If he then finally chose to attack Kappadokia and thus went against demands from Rome, beginning the First Mithridatic War, it was because his kingdom and his royal prestige could not continue to bow to humiliation from the Roman commission members and the weak, although Roman affiliated, Nikomedes IV.

**Roman ambitions**

Their readiness to characterise Mithridates as the aggressive party challenging Roman rule has caused scholars to disregard and/or overlook Roman magistrates’ and pro-magistrates’ eager attempts to stir up and prolong the wars against Pontos. As argued above, the Roman commission headed by Aquilius and Cassius was responsible for the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War. By encouraging Nikomedes IV to attack Pontos in 89 BC and by attacking Mithridates when the later withdrew to his previous position in Kappadokia, the commission never looked for a peaceful solution. Instead they provoked Mithridates into beginning the war, which the Pontic withdrawal
from Bithynia and Kappadokia had started. When Mithridates to everyone’s surprise won the first round and conquered Roman Asia, the Senate declared war on Pontos. But instead of approaching the danger as an urgent issue, members of the Roman elite felt secure enough to fight amongst themselves to obtain command of the Roman armies. Later, after the First Mithridatic War, Pontos was again attack by Roman forces, this time led by Murena who had been left behind to reorganise Asia. The so-called Second Mithridatic War is best described as a war of plunder, used as an opportunity to collect booty and enhance prestige, essential elements for succeeding in a political career. Mithridates hesitated to meet Murena in open battle and encouraged Sulla to respect the agreement between the Kingdom of Pontos and Sulla made in 85 BC. Only when a second attack by Murena convinced Mithridates that war was Rome’s official policy did he move out to defeat Murena.

The Third Mithridatic War opened with a Pontic attack on Bithynia, which after the death of Nikomedes IV had become a Roman province. It has been common practice to see this hostile move as part of a well-planed attack on Rome. Pontos was, no doubt, threatened by the Roman presence in Bithynia, which brought Roman forces closer to the Pontic interior and gave Rome control over the vital straits between Europe and Asia. Mithridates had, according to our sources, made an alliance with Sertorius, the general leading the revolt in Spain, and organised payment for his troops as indicated by a rise in the production of Pontic coins. Pontos was indeed prepared for a war on Rome, but to give Mithridates the entire responsibility for beginning this war is too simplistic. Mithridates tried to reach a peace agreement on two separate occasions: once, when Sulla was still alive, and again after the dictator’s death. As part of the first attempt, the Pontic delegation was ordered to withdraw completely from Kappadokia. Later on, when a second delegation reached Rome, both the Senate and the consul showed no wish to make peace. Instead, Roman magistrates argued for a new war on Pontos, and Lucullus managed to shift his provincial appointment from the peaceful Gallia Cisalpina to a command against Pontos. The question of who was to command was part of the competition among Roman magistrates to obtain and secure their share of power in the new political situation emerging after the death of Sulla. If Mithridates did indeed make an alliance with Sertorius it is most likely to have happened after Rome refused to sign a treaty, something Mithridates may reasonably have seen as a declaration of war.

Two episodes challenge the view of Rome as the aggressor looking for an opportunity to wage war on Pontos and the attempt to view Mithridates as the more reluctant party trying to avoid open conflict. The first episode took place in 97 BC, when Rome ordered Pontos and Bithynia to withdraw from their positions in Paphalagonia and Kappadokia. If Rome politically and militarily was strong enough to force the Anatolian kings to follow her demands and if it is true that Roman magistrates were keen to wage war as a way to accumulate wealth and prestige, why did Rome not invade Pontos when the
political situation had become more settled after the Jugurthine and Cimbrian Wars? The other episode occurred during the Social War, when the Italian allies, according to Diodoros, approached Mithridates hoping to persuade him to join them.18 The Italian approach to Mithridates is interesting as it raises the question why the Italian allies asked him to join the alliance, if he did not at least appear as an enemy of Rome.

The situation in the early 90's BC was in many ways different than in the years just prior to the First Mithridatic War. Rome was in the middle of the Celtiberian War (98-93 BC), which certainly did draw on Rome's military resources. But it was not lack of interest that delayed Rome's attack on Pontos. According to Plutarch, one of the main reasons why Marius visited Anatolia in 99-98 BC was to stir up a war on Pontos, which could provide him with a new, important, and prestigious command.19 Mithridates did not fall for the trick and gave no excuse for Marius to argue for war. Whether Rome and her magistrates did regard Pontos and Mithridates as the perfect enemy already from the beginning of the 1st century BC is another open question. Mithridates was no doubt successful and resourceful, but he was also a client king with ties to Rome. A war on Pontos over eastern Paphlagonia, some of Galatia, and Kappadokia could lead to a much larger war jeopardizing both stability and Roman control over Anatolia in general. From the Senate's point of view this also required troops from the West, and there was no reason to risk war with an ambitious but also loyal and immensely resourceful king, who even showed Rome the respect of seeking her approval for his territorial gains; particularly not if the primary reason was to provide a forum in which Marius, no hero to the Senate, could regain some of his lost popularity with the Roman plebs.

The reasons why the Italian allies approached Mithridates are complex. If the story is more than just a convenient attempt to connect Mithridates to each and every alliance against Rome, it remains obscure why the Italian allies approached Mithridates and what they expected from this contact. In the last years of the war, the situation for the Italian alliance seemed more and more desperate, and they may have been looking for any help they could get. It was hardly any secret that the relationship between Rome and Mithridates had suffered from the Roman order to withdraw from Kappadokia, just as Mithridates improved his position after the death of Nikomedes III and the alliance with Armenia left the impression of a strong Pontic state. But if Mithridates was an obvious partner in a war on Rome, why was he not contacted earlier, when the Italian socii carefully planned the break with Rome? Mithridates never joined the Italian cause and the socii's request, if it ever was made, is likely to have been a last resort.

In summation: Mithridates' policies towards Rome were in many ways defensive. Certainly his conquests, particularly in Anatolia, were against Roman interests. Yet it is important to stress that Mithridates did not attack the Roman Empire before the Roman commission and Nikomedes IV attacked his interests. When engaging in Kappadokia and Bithynia in 90 BC, Mithri-
dates did not launch an attack on Asia, but tried to conceal his takeover of the two Anatolian kingdoms through the use of Sokrates and Armenia. Had he felt strong enough to challenge Rome and at that time desired a war on Rome, this would have been the best time to strike Asia. Instead, Mithridates chose a strategy, where he accepted every demand Rome was ready to put force behind indicating that war with the Romans was to be avoided. What Mithridates aimed at was enlarging his kingdom as far as possible, without engaging in a war with Rome, something he knew had historically led to the destruction of the challenging kingdom. Mithridates was not simply a victim of Roman imperialism or the ambitions of Roman magistrates pursuing a political career in Rome. His attempt to enlarge his kingdom in Anatolia was bound to collide with Roman interests, particularly from the time he invaded Bithynia and turned his interest towards the borders of the Roman Empire. Yet, what seems equally clear is that Mithridates was not the aggressor that modern scholars have believed and believe him to be. The two images of the hateful king and the saviour king freeing the Greek world from the rule of Rome are exaggerated and do not take into consideration the actual policy followed by Rome and Pontos accordingly. As argued by Gabrielsen, Mithridates’ strategy in Anatolia was influenced by both his own ambitions and local expectations to enlarge his kingdom, which takes us further than the trivial discussion of Mithridates as the wicked, hateful king. It is also convincing that an important part of his policy was the avoidance of a war with Rome. Today, in retrospect, this may seem naive. Yet at the beginning of the first century BC, when Rome had hesitated both in 107 and again in 101 BC and was further weakened by both the Social War and internal disputes, it may have been the right time not to attack Rome, which would have forced Rome to respond, but rather to attack the weak client kingdoms controlled primarily by the Roman nobility.

Notes

1 Mommsen 1925, 280-281.
2 Badian 1958, 289; Glew 1977, 404.
3 Reinach 1895, 294-295; Bengtson 1975, 252; McGing 1986, 85; Strobel 1996, 188; Hind 1994, 144-145.
4 Duggan 1958, 9; Antonelli 1992, 7.
6 For a detailed account of Mithridates’ conquests and extended political and military influence in Anatolia and the Black Sea region, see Hind 1994, 129-164.
7 Hind 1994, 139-140.
8 Just. Epit. 37.4.
9 Just. Epit. 38.1.
10 Plut. Sull. 5.3.
11 Cic. Phil. 12.27; see also Gabba 1994, 105, 118.
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13 McGing 1986, 79; App. Mith. 2.10; Just. Epit. 38.3.
14 For a more detailed treatment of the First Mithridatic War, see Hind 1994, 144-149.
15 App. Mith. 9.65.
   Reinach 1895, 315.
18 Diod. Sic. 37.2.11.

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